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Northwestern Somalia, although it is 
part and parcel of the larger context 
of the Somali civil war which affects 
all Somali populations in the Horn, 
stands out as a particular political con-
text. The region declared secession as 
an independent state as early as 1991 
under the name of “Somaliland.” It is 
generally peaceful and has known a 
reasonably stable measure of govern-
ment since 1997. Democratic (exter-
nally monitored) elections were held 
in 2002, 2003, and 2005. The fledgling 
state-apparatus however, is tiny and 
severely under-funded. Political stabil-
ity has been maintained via a peculiar 
mix of institutions and actors, state as well as non-state ones, with a 
pivotal role for the elders and the political strongholders of the vari-
ous Somaliland clans and subclans. Clan politics is a real and important 
factor in Somaliland’s making and functioning today. In the absence of 
a protecting and providing state, clan allegiance is a determining fac-
tor as far as individual physical and economic security are concerned. 
Apart from clan, Islam is felt very strongly about. The persistent situa-
tion of insecurity and uncertainty over the past fifteen years seems to 
have only exacerbated this.
Islam in a stateless society
The clan-system and Islam have co-existed for centuries as institu-
tions suited to the needs of an egalitarian Somali pastoralist society. 
In Somali mythical history, the clan system is as old as Islam itself. It is 
traced back to the advent of Muslim traders on the Somali coast. Arab 
traders, who were to various degrees related to the Prophet himself, 
married Somali women, thus starting the lineages which make up 
the clan-system today. Somali clans take pride in 
never having known “paganism.” The Somali pol-
ity was a so-called “stateless society.” In a context 
without formal political hierarchy social order and 
peace were guaranteed via customary law2 (heer), 
a system of contracts between roaming pastoral-
ist (patrilinear) descent groups belonging to the 
larger groups called “clans” and “clan families.” 
Heer varies from place to place, depending on 
situations, circumstances, and groups involved. In 
matters concerning family-related issues such as 
marriage, divorce, or inheritance, heer is consid-
ered heavily influenced by the Sharia. Yet, rather 
than being based on individual responsibility, 
heer is characterized by collective responsibility, 
which is in fact at variance with Islamic ortho-
doxy. When blood compensation (diya) is paid in 
case of death or injury, it is paid collectively by 
the descent group of the perpetrator to the de-
scent group of the victim. In decisions concerning 
a particular descent group or in case of conflict 
between two descent groups, the group’s elders 
are collectively in charge. The elders see to it that 
the interests of the group are protected either by 
negotiation or by having the able men of the group take up arms. In 
the daily dealings of the descent group, the role of these elders, the 
so-called “spear bearers” (waranleh) is complemented with the role 
of another type of elders: the “men of religion” (wadaad). In principle, 
these men are excluded from full participation in secular politics: they 
are by definition non-combatants in 
conflicts between descent groups and 
they do not participate in political de-
liberations pertaining to their group’s 
interest. They are supposed to play a 
mediating role in case of conflict. Ex-
cept, that is, when the war is a jihad. 
One famous “wadaad” of the Darood 
clan however, Sayyid Mohamed Ab-
dule Hassan, nicknamed by the British 
protectorate forces “the Mad Mullah” 
became a political leader. He waged a 
long and bloody jihad against Christian 
occupation (British as well as Ethiopian) 
of Somali lands from 1901 to 1920. He 
thereby predominantly attacked fight-
ing forces of other Somali clans he considered as traitors because they 
had aligned themselves with the British “infidels.” 
A wadaad can be anything from a member of a nomadic group who 
knows some Arabic and has more than average devotion and knowl-
edge of religion to a truly learned man, a shaykh with intimate knowl-
edge of Quran and Islamic jurisprudence. The religious men attend to 
the religious affairs of their lineage: they solemnize marriages, give 
their blessings, settle divorce and inheritance matters, direct Friday 
prayers, and so on. Their services are rewarded with gifts—some of 
the wadaads rely entirely on charity for their livelihood, as any gift to 
a wadaad brings a reward from God. In the fifteenth century, the in-
troduction of the Qadiriyya brotherhood in Somalia gave rise to the 
foundation of brotherhood “settlements.” In these religious communi-
ties, pious Somali from different clan backgrounds lived together as 
brothers, devoting themselves to cultivation, animal husbandry, reli-
gious study, and worship. In addition, they protected the sick, the old, 
and the disabled and provided religious education to future wadaado. 
Independent Somalia
The 1960 independence signalled the advent of modern state struc-
tures to Somalia. In 1969, the civil regime was overthrown by a military 
coup. The coup leader, General Siyyad Barre, immediately outlawed the 
Somali clan system. Sharia remained formally part of the legal system, 
but in practice it played a marginal role. The regime displaced any po-
tentially competing structure—aiming for total legal and political con-
trol. Protests against the promulgation of the new family law of 1975, 
which in accordance with the proclaimed socialist ideals of Barre (but 
in contravention of the Sharia) granted equal inheritance rights to men 
and women, were immediately crushed by executing ten religious men 
who had stood up against the law. Barre added the extra-legal National 
Security Courts to the judiciary system, bringing arbitrariness and ter-
ror to the Somali. Traditional clan elders were made into state agents as 
so-called peacekeepers between the “ex-clans.” At the same time, clan 
was instrumentalized politically. In the government’s discourse, Islam, 
as well, was “Siyyadized” to serve the ideological purposes of the mili-
tary regime.
The regime’s “socialist” ideology with its secular, materialist outlook 
and its dictatorial style of government was a thorn in the side of an 
increasing number of Somali political and social actors, including a 
(relatively small and very loosely connected) group of Islamist activists. 
These Islamists stated that they wanted to establish an Islamic public 
order—eventually culminating in the establishment of an Islamic state 
based on the Sharia. One aspect of their ideology stood out as similar 
to Barre’s proclaimed ideals for the Somali state: the Islamists wanted 
to do away with the clan system. They resented clanism as a political in-
strument that served Barre to keep Somali Muslims divided and under 
A reformist brand of Islam emerged and 
consolidated during the decades of the 
Somali civil war, which began in the early 
1980s—leading up to outright state collapse 
in 1991. Initially, its socio-political position 
was rather marginal. Proponents of the new 
brand denounced the dominant local Sufi 
Islam as well as the Somali clan system, to 
which it was traditionally closely associated. 
Soon however, lack of political and military 
success seems to have forced the Islamists 
back into the organically grown interaction 
between Somali Islam and the ubiquitous 
clan system, its politics, and institutions. 
At least for the time being.1
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are much preferred beneficiaries of zakat: the Prophet himself was an 
orphan. As for the educational activities organized by the “new” reli-
gious men, these were a far cry from the traditional religious educa-
tion provided by the wadaad in roaming Quranic schools (known as 
dugsi in Somali). The educational institutions they set up were similar 
to the so-called écoles franco-arabes in Western Africa (Senegal, Mali, 
etc.) with a broad curriculum but with a strong religious orientation. As 
such, these private Islamic schools have (together with other private 
initiatives) filled part of the gap left by the defunct Somali state educa-
tional system. They teach Arabic (which is the language of instruction 
at these schools) and Islamic sciences, but also marketable skills such 
as math, English, or computer sciences. The schools sometimes even 
belong to a formalized international network which gives the school’s 
graduates direct access to further education at Arab or Islamic universi-
ties worldwide. 
Skills such as math, Arabic, and English are highly practical tools 
when doing business. Indeed, business seems to be the preferred oc-
cupation of the “new” religious men. Many of them became well-to-do 
businessmen, involved in contracting or trade. They are valued busi-
ness counterparts (sometimes operating as subcontractors for interna-
tional agencies) as they have a reputation as honest, diligent, and effi-
cient workers who finish their work within the agreed deadlines. Some 
sources claim that the better part of businesses in Somaliland is in fact 
controlled by these Muslim-believer type entrepreneurs. As such, once 
more, they are respected members of their communities, generating 
welfare as well as actual wealth.
The economic activities of the “new” religious men, however, high-
light the most crucial difference with the traditional wadaad. Whereas 
the old wadaad was for his survival dependent on 
handouts from his clansmen—in cash or kind—
the “new” religious man is economically independ-
ent, cultivating all kinds of business connections, 
independently from his lineage. Despite their ap-
parent re-integration as a new kind of “wadaad” 
in the age-old interaction between Somali Islam 
and the clan system, their economic independ-
ence and power constitute a crucial change and 
may make for a fundamentally altered political 
dynamic in the future.
control. Yet, while Islamist armed 
militancy slowly started to develop, 
it was overtaken in speed by clan 
based military movements. In Janu-
ary 1991 Hawiye clan militia (Gen-
eral Aideed’s “United Somali Con-
gress”) overran Mogadishu, ousted 
Barre and ended the twenty-one 
years of military dictatorship. Soma-
lia fell apart, dismembered in ever 
more disintegrating clan-fiefdoms.
Upon the disintegration of the 
regime and the country a new dy-
namic ensued in the Islamist sphere. 
Part of the Islamist militants and 
sympathizers decided to stay out 
of the war between the clan-based 
militia and went back to their own 
clan areas where they promoted 
an Islamic public order from below, 
getting involved in various social ac-
tivities, particularly education and 
health/sanitation related ones. An-
other part of the Islamist militants 
resorted to violent means, forming 
the then only trans-clan militia of 
the war, referred to as Al Itihaad (“Islamic Union”). The Islamist Al Iti-
haad behaved and operated like any other militia, trying to secure ter-
ritory and strategic assets to make money out of them. Without long-
term success, however. The Islamist militia was beaten by clan militia 
wherever they tried to set up shop in Somalia, be it Kismayo, Bossaaso, 
Las Qoray (Somaliland), or elsewhere. Unless they teamed up with one 
of the clan factions, they remained politically and militarily unable to 
establish themselves as a sustainable administration. Towards the mid-
1990s, the Somali Al Itihaad militia disbanded: the rank and file just 
went home to their clan areas (including the new Somaliland state) 
while the leadership went on to pursue other avenues to further the 
Islamist project—within, rather than against the clan system.3
Islamists in peace-time Somaliland: the “wadaad” 
revisited?
Despite their ideological disapproval of the Somali clan system, Is-
lamists had to re-insert themselves into that system in order to safe-
guard their physical safety (and ultimately their political project). Ex-
plicit Islamist political activism was virtually impossible in Somaliland’s 
clan-based polity of the late 1990s. Proponents of an Islamic public 
order became very prominent in business and charity: living, working, 
and preaching among their clansmen.
Their teachings still propagated a “new” Islam, stressing values such 
as a strict moral code, modesty in dress, and hard work as well as de-
nouncing typical Sufi practices such as dikhr or religious chanting. They 
also strongly disapproved of the chewing of qaat, a herbal stimulant 
and favourite past-time of the overwhelming majority of the male pop-
ulation. From a religious attribute for Sufi shaykhs who used it for medi-
tation, qaat had developed into a social vice, taking up huge parts of 
household budgets, workers’ time, and causing health problems such 
as mental disorders. Although their religious teachings (especially con-
cerning qaat) by no means went uncontested, the “new” religious men 
were respected in their communities for their virtuous behaviour and 
their religious knowledge.
Like the “old” wadaad, these “new” religious men were part and parcel 
of their clans, yet, without a central role to play in actual clan politics. 
A few of them appear to have been involved in talks following political 
conflicts between clans or between the Somaliland government and 
self-appointed representatives communicating “clan grievances,” thus 
allegedly fulfilling the traditional tasks of religious wise men trying to 
temper conflict. More importantly however, they have been devoting 
considerable energy—as did the “old” wadaad —to charity and educa-
tion.
A pet project for Islamic charity is, for example, the construction and 
maintenance of orphanages. Quite a few were set up in Somaliland, ei-
ther with the help of locally generated funds or with proceedings from 
zakat collected and sent over by Muslims abroad. To be sure, orphans 
Notes
1. I would like to thank Markus Höhne and 
Tobias Hagmann for their comments on an 
earlier version of this article.
2. In “Xeer,” the “X” is pronounced like the “H” in 
the Arabic name “Hassan.” 
3. This is also true today in the case of the 
much later developing Mogadishu-based 
“Islamic Courts” movement, which briefly 
administered parts of Mogadishu from mid-
2006 to the military intervention of external 
forces (USA and Ethiopia) in the winter of 
2006–7. The Courts did actively rely on clan 
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